Poli-416: **Revolution & Political Violence**
TODAY’S AGENDA

1. Bargaining in general (but really between states)

2. Bargaining in civil wars
Fearon on Rationalist Explanations for War
Central Puzzle

War is *ex-poste* inefficient

War is costly; actors know this

Outright extermination rare

Negotiations/agreement/treaty end war

Why then, can’t actors reach agreement *ex ante* and avoid war?
Bargaining and War

“There always exists a set of negotiated settlements that both sides prefer to fighting”
Changing costs of war

How does cost of war $\rightarrow$ size of bargaining space?

Bargaining space *increases* in war costs

What factors might increase war costs?
Changing costs of war

Dictators face more punishment for losing war than others

Debs and Goemans (2010)

ICC-type institutions make bad leaders less likely to seek exile

Krcmaric (2018)
How did we get there?

Assumptions
- There is some true $p$
- Risk-averse leaders
- Perfectly divisible issue space

Meaning
- winning is probabilistic
- Prefer 50¢ over 50/50 chance at a dollar
- Split the pie, Side payments

Failure?
- mad(wo-)man? Nukes?
- Personality?
- Sacred values?
Personality in Bargaining

WHO FIGHTS FOR REPUTATION
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEADERS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
KEREN YARHI-MILO

I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.

Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  Agree

My behavior is usually an expression of my true inner feelings, attitudes, and beliefs.

Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  Agree

At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.

Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  Agree

I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.

Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  Agree

I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.

Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  Agree

Figure 4-5: Self-monitoring scores and average number of MID involvement per year (by...
Sacred Values and Indivisibility

To study possible trade-offs between sacred values and material rewards, in 2005 we talked with families and supporters of Palestinian suicide bombers. We asked about the amount of compensation that their society should give to the family of a suicide bomber. We found that willingness to allow compensation decreased as the amount offered increased: one hundred thousand dinars is significantly less acceptable than ten thousand dinars, and one million dinars is much less acceptable (Atran 2007a). Follow-up interviews clearly point to a willingness to accept minimal compensation for loss of a family member (who may be a helper or wage earner) and one’s home (Israeli retaliation often includes destruction of the bomber’s house). Nevertheless, Palestinians see more substantial payments to families as unacceptable, even disgusting, because they would create the impression that the martyr had acted as a materially calculating actor rather than as a martyr devoted to a moral cause.

Attempts to divide “sacred values” can produce negative effects
Atran and Axelrod (2008)
## Territory and Symbolic Value

Table 1: Experimental Design

After the recent military operation in Gaza, the Israeli government came to the conclusion that it needs to take an action that may have a strong impact on Israel’s economy, security, and social arenas. Below are the consequences of two possible policies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Policy A</th>
<th>Policy B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>Israeli control in the West Bank will remain unchanged</td>
<td>Israel will withdraw from most of the West Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly</td>
<td>Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Israel’s economy will be severely harmed</td>
<td>Israel’s economy will grow significantly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>The security, education, and health budgets will remain in their present form</td>
<td>The security budget will decrease, and the education and health budgets will increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Israeli government turns to the public to decide between these two policies in a plebiscite. Based on the information presented in the table above, which policy would you support?

1. Policy A
2. Policy B

## Table 2: Values for Policy Outcomes in Conjoint Experiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain (T)</th>
<th>Values</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territory</td>
<td>1. Israeli control in the West Bank will remain unchanged.</td>
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<td></td>
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<th>Security (S)</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>1. Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy (E)</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>1. The economy will remain unchanged.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Israel’s economy will be severely harmed.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Israel’s economy will grow significantly.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Budget (B)</th>
<th>Values</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>1. The security, education, and health budgets will remain unchanged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On the other hand, we find that over 50 percent of right-wing voters explicitly prefer retaining control over the West Bank even when terrorist violence increases substantially, the economy is severely harmed, and the budget allocation to health and education is reduced (“all else bad”). This group, representing about a third of all respondents, can be said to hold intangible territorial attachment. For them, no bargaining space exists, rendering the territory effectively indivisible.\textsuperscript{14}
Why war?

**Explanation**
- Private information
- Incentives to misrepresent

**Real-world**
- Military tech, Fog of war
- Small attacks, Build up on border
- Capture territory

**Card simulation**
- Face-down cards
- Bluffing

**Commitment problems**
- N/A
Overcoming information problems

Costly signals

Signal too costly for weak actor to send

Examples?

- hand-tying
- Third-party mediators
- International monitoring
Commitment problems

Where do they come from?

Incentives to renege

First-strike shrinks the bargaining range

Shifting power balance
Bargaining in Civil Wars
Same concepts, Different applications

Informational asymmetries
Commitment problems
Informational asymmetries

In most cases, states know very little about armed groups, their capabilities, or whereabouts. Especially true in the countries where armed conflicts tend to take place, why?

Where was Abimael Guzman, Leader of Shining Path, Public enemy #1, hiding?
Distinguishing types

Rebel strength

Fight
Concede

Fight
Concede

How can states tell what world they’re in?
Uncertainty about rebels

Why would weak rebels fight?
- Signal strength
- Own capability unclear
- Shifting patrons, income

Where is uncertainty highest?
- Rough terrain
- Middling rebels
- Multi-party conflicts
States also “bluff”

One important source of uncertainty is **state resolve**

(potential) rebels willing to fight a state with **low resolve**
(potential) rebels avoid state with **high resolve**

How to signal resolve?

Halabja monument in Iraq

What kinds of countries likely to have worst resolve problems?
Why might reneging happen

Sources:

Government will renege on agreement

Why would the government do this?

Changing balance of power

Fixed political cleavages

Democratic politics
Commitment Problems
In Action

Agreement signed between FARC and Colombian government

Public votes to ratify it: narrow
loss for the agreement

Gov't scrambles, passes through congress

What might this signal to the FARC?
Commitment Problems in Israel

Benjamin Netanyahu’s plan to annex a massive part of the West Bank, explained

Israel’s prime minister wants to seize the Jordan Valley — a move that would bury the two-state solution for good.

Announced right before an election

How might elections muck up negotiations?
When to Democratize?

Democratization might allow groups to resolve conflicts via the ballot

But when to hold elections?

Looking across all conflicts, countries that hold post-war elections sooner tend to see more violence

why?

Brancati and Snyder (2012)
“Balance of Power” and Demographics in Israel

Changing demographics in Israel and Palestine change conflict-termination calculus.

What are the implications of two-state vs. one-state?

Jews, Arabs nearing population parity in Holy Land: Israeli officials

Jeffrey Heller

JERUSALEM (Reuters) - The number of Jews and Arabs between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River is at or near parity, figures cited by Israeli officials show, raising questions whether Israel can remain a democracy if it keeps territory where Palestinians seek a state.
Why doesn’t reneging happen more?

Civil war between rebel group and state
State offers concessions if rebels give up arms
Rebels come out of hiding, give up arms
What’s to stop state from wiping out rebels?

Third-party mediation
Monitoring
Power-sharing agreements
Protection
Uncertainty of re-arm